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U. S. Military Exports and the
Armed Export Control Act of 1976.
The F-16 Sale to Iran
T HERE CAN BE NO WAR without weapons. Yet the
trend of history strongly suggests that mankind is far from
ready to part with either. Since the end of the Second World
War, there have been 55 significant armed conflicts throughout
the world.1 Further, the international marketing of increasingly
destructive weapons of war has expanded at an unprecedented
rate. Total yearly international sales of conventional weapons
have grown from $300 million in fiscal year 1952 to an estimated
$20 billion in fiscal year 1975.2 Although the proliferation of
nuclear weapons may appear to be a matter of greater urgency,
it should be stressed that the astronomical market figures just
outlined reflect the trade in conventional, not nuclear weapons.
More important, the death and destruction that has attended post-
war armed conflict has resulted exclusively from the use of con-
ventional weapons.
The history of efforts to curb the international trade in con-
ventional arms is not a success story.3  Attempts to limit the
arms trade through the League of Nations and the United Na-
tions have been so ineffective that they have served ". . . mere-
ly as symbolic gestures of disapproval."4 There may be many rea-
sons for this lack of success. George Thayer advances an expla-
nation which should be considered:
Member countries of the U.N. will gladly vote for "disarma-
ment" and nuclear restrictions because it is good public rela-
tions, but few would be affected by the decisions. They may
vote for an arms embargo against South Africa, but only be-
cause it is a specific reaction against an unpopular and vulner-
able nation and few will be affected. But any across-the-board
I G. THAYER, THE WAR BusINEss 2 (1969).
2 Mayer, Norman, Scott, Anatomy of the Arms Trade, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6,
1976, at 39.
3 STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE ARMS TRADE
WITH THE THIRD WORLD 86-132 (1971). Chapter 2 traces the history of interna-
tional efforts to control the trade of arms.
4 R. HARKAVY, THE ARMS TRADE AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS 221 (1975).
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vote to restrict their own lifeblood - arms - would be dismissed
as inappropriate.5
By default, the responsibility for initiating and executing policies
to control the international trade in conventional weapons has fal-
len on the producing nations individually.
The United States leads the world in exports of conventional
weapons. United States exports in fiscal year 1975 reached
$9.5 billion -- up from $798 million in fiscal year 1968, an in-
crease of 1,200 percent. 6  Further, in the ten year period from
1965 through 1974, the United States exported $24.5 billion in
conventional weapons to underdeveloped nations, an amount re-
presenting 53 percent of the total arms shipments to the Third
World.7
It is not just the quantity of exports that has changed. There
has also been a significant change in the quality of the arms ex-
ported. Sales of the most advanced United States conventional
arms to foreign buyers, including nations of the Third World,
are becoming common.8  This trend has been the subject of
sharp criticism. Senator Edward Kennedy has suggested that the
trend of international sales of conventional weapons by the United
States indicates an ". . . apparently indiscriminate Administra-
tion policy of selling as much military equipment as foreign coun-
tries will pay for."9 This criticism was firmly restated by Senator
Nelson, with particular emphasis on United States weapons sales
to the Mideast:
More than half of our foreign military sales in recent years
have been made to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and Mideast.
Such sales have major foreign policy implications, but there is
little if any evidence that the Administration has given adequate
G. THAYER, supra note 1, at 375. In a television interview conducted on
Jan. 3, 1964, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated substantially the same
point:
I recall that at the United Nations General Assembly, at a time when
all the members were voting unanimously for disarmament, 70 mem-
bers were at that moment asking us for military assistance.
6 U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FOREIGN MILITARY SALES AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE
FACTS 14-15 (1975).
7 U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPEN-
DITURES AND ARMS TRANSFERS 73 (1976).
8 Klare, The Political Economy of Arms Sales, BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCI-
ENTISTS, Nov., 1976, at 12.
9121 CONG. REC. S2409 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
See also Kennedy, The Persian Gulf. Arms Race or Arms Control, 54 FOR. AFF. 14
(1975).
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thought to the long-range diplomatic or military consequences
of such weapons transfers.10
This criticism has been met with the assertions that United States
sales of conventional arms are both a useful instrument for con-
ducting foreign policy and an important economic asset."
What is the policy of the United States regarding the sale of
conventional weapons to the Third World? How is the policy
being implemented? On June 30, 1976, President Ford signed
into law the International Security Assistance and Arms Export
Control Act of 1976.12 The International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976 amends two older laws: The
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,13 and the Foreign Military Sales
Act. 14  Both pieces of legislation deal with the subject of con-
ventional arms sales. Section 503(a) of the Foreign Assistance
Act authorizes the President to make sales of weapons as an option
in establishing a program of military assistance to a friendly na-
tion. The Foreign Assistance Act seems much more applicable to
U.S. participation in foreign military programs than to sales of
U.S. arms to foreign nations. The Foreign Military Sales Act,
in contrast, is concerned exclusively with the sale of United States
conventional weaponry to foreign countries. The Foreign Military
Sales Act purports to ". . . consolidate and revise foreign as-
sistance legislation relating to reimbursable military exports. '"15
The amendments contained in Title II of the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, together with
the Foreign Military Sales Act present the most current con-
solidation and revision of U.S. law governing the sale of conventional
weapons to foreign nations. Therefore, the Foreign Military Sales
Act, and the amendments in Title II will be the focus of this
inquiry. It should be noted that section 201 of Title II provides
that the Foreign Military Sales Act is to be renamed the Arms
Export Control Act. Because Title II amends the Foreign Mili-
10 122 CONG. REC. S15526 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Nelson).
11 Loosbi'ock, Keeping Foreign Military Sales in Perspective, AIR FORCE, Feb.,
1976, at 4-5. See also Gray, Traffic Control for the Arms Trade, 6 FOR. POL'Y 153
(1972).
12 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 729 (1976) [hereinafter cited as International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976].
13 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (1961).
14 Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (1968) [here-
inafter cited as Foreign Military Sales Act].
is Id.
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tary Sales Act, the original Act and the amendments will be
treated as one. 16
This Note will examine the recently approved 7 $3.8 billion
sale of 160 F-16 fighter aircraft to Iran 18 as a case study of the
operation of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. The purposes
of this examination are to determine: (1) What the United States
policy is regarding conventional arms sales to underdeveloped
nations; (2) how this policy has been implemented in the current,
major sale of a sophisticated warplane to Iran; and, (3) what
changes might be necessary to bring arms sales into line with the
stated purposes and goals of the legislation.
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the authority under
which the letter of offer for the purchase of the F-16 was approved,
makes reference to the goal of achieving a world ". . . free
from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of arma-
ments ... "19 Reflecting the continuing effort to realize this
goal, the Act states an ongoing policy commitment of the United
States ". . . to encourage regional arms control and disarmament
agreements and to discourage arms races. ' 20 The Act stresses,
however, that the cost and complexity of modern defense equip-
ment may place intolerable burdens on the ability of a foreign
country, particularly an underdeveloped nation, to meet "... all
of its legitimate defense requirements from its own design and
production base."' 21 Recognizing this inability, the Act provides
that the United States will enter into cooperative international re-
lationships with friendly countries for the purpose of satisfying
mutual defense requirements. To further facilitate the common
defense the Act authorizes the United States Government to make
sales of military equipment, subject to enumerated restraints.22
16 In the interest of clarity a textual reference to the Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, the Arms Export Control Act or, simply, the Act will include both
the Foreign Military Sales Act and the amendments presented in Title II. If
a specific provision of the older law or an amendment under Title 1I is quoted,
it will be cited as such.
17 The notification of the letter for the sale to the Government of Iran was
made by the President to the Speaker of the House and to tle Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Sept. 1, 1976. Under amended sec-
tion 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 the letter was automati-
cally approved in the absence of a concurrent resolution of Congress objecting
to the sale.
is Supra note 10.
iS Foreign Military Sales Act 5 1.
a id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
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It seems that two important general policy statements are made
in the Arms Export Control Act. First, there is a recognition of
the need to restrain the sale of conventional arms, particularly
where the sales may provoke a regional arms race, or bring about
economic instability within the recipient country. Second, there
is emphasis placed upon the desirability of allowing friendly na-
tions to assess their own defense requirements and to assume a
larger role in meeting these national defense requirements. To
this end, the Act provides for foreign purchases of U.S. conven-
tional arms. It seems clear that there is no notion in the state-
ments of policy that arms shipments are evil per se, but that arms
sales can only be made under close supervision.
The main thrust of the limitations on the ability of individual
foreign nations to purchase arms is contained in section 3, en-
titled "Eligibility. '"23  No sale of any weapon or defense service 24
shall be made unless: (1) The President determines that world
peace and United States security will be enhanced by the sale;
(2) the recipient country agrees to make no transfer of any de-
fense article sold without express prior consent of the President;
and, (3) the recipient nation will provide adequate security for
all weapons purchased. 25  Having defined the eligibility require-
ments for nations seeking to buy weapons from the United States,
section 4-presents a limitation on the purposes for which the weap-
ons may be used. Providing for internal security and national
self-defense, as well as meeting the requirements of collective
security arrangements are the only appropriate uses of purchased
conventional weapons.
Complementing the restrictions on the eligibility of recipient
nations to enter the market for United States arms, and restric-
tions on the use of purchased weapons are a body of restraints
on the United States arms market itself. Section 21(a) authorizes
the President to make sales of arms from Department of Defense
stocks to any eligible foreign country if payment for the arms is
to be made in United States dollars.26 In the case of defense
services sold to a foreign nation, amended section 21(c) prohibits
United States personnel from performing duties of a combatant
23 Id. § 3.
21 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976
215(4). A defense service includes any ". .. service, test, inspection, repair,
training, publication, technical or other assistance .
25 Foreign Military Sales Act § 3(a)(1), (2), (3).
2 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976
205.
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nature. Duties of a combatant nature would include ".
training, advising, or otherwise providing assistance regarding
combat activities. ... 27 This provision seems to emphasize
that the justification for allowing arms sales is to enable the re-
cipient nation to meet legitimate defense requirements, not to give
the recipient nation the ability to wage a war of aggression with
the aid of purchased weapons and technical guidance. Like the
provisions against resale of weapons by the recipient country con-
tained in section 21(a), section 21(c) is intended to produce effec-
tive end-use control.
Section 22, entitled "Procurement for Cash Sales," directly
governs the financial details of the sale of the F-16. Section 22
applies particularly to this sale because the F-16 is not an item in
Department of Defense stocks, nor does Iran require credit finan-
cing for the purchase. Section 22(a) authorizes the President to
enter into procurement contracts for the sale of weapons or de-
fense services providing that the recipient country makes a de-
pendable undertaking to meet the obligations of the contract.
The requirements of a dependable undertaking are: (1) Protection
from any loss of the United States on the contract; and, (2) an
understanding that the recipient nation will release funds as re-
quired to meet contract payments or to compensate for costs
resulting from cancellation.
As demonstrated, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 im-
poses restrictions on the abilities of prospective recipient. nations
to buy and on the abilities of the United States Government to
sell defense services and weapons. But these provisions would
have little efficacy without new sections 21(f), 25 and 36. These
three sections are action-forcing provisions in that they require
that all sales made pursuant to the Act be disclosed to the pub-
lic and the Congress. Under section 21(f) the public is to be in-
formed of all arms sales "... to the fullest extent possible con-
sistent with the national security of the United States. ''28
Sections 25 and 36 impose requirements on the President to inform
Congress before the sale of conventional weapons may proceed.
Paragraphs (1), (3), and (4) of section 25(a) require the Presi-
dent to give specific estimates of arms sales expected to occur as
a part of his fiscal year proposal for security assistance programs.
Paragraph (1) requires the President to report estimates of the
amount of sales to be made to each country under sections 21 and
27 Id.
2 id.
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22. The report of estimates must include "... a detailed expla-
nation of the foreign policy and United States security considera-
tions involved in expected sales to each country."29 Under para-
graph (3) the President is required to demonstrate how each
sale ". . . will strengthen the security of the United States and
promote world peace." 3  Finally, paragraph (4) provides that the
President must also prepare an arms control impact statement
for each purchasing country. This impact statement should in-
clude an analysis of the effect of the sale on arms control efforts
in the purchasing country and the region in general. Part (b) of
paragraph (4) gives authority to the Speaker of the House and to
the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to
receive additional information from the President within 30 days
of their request.
Section 36(a), as amended, requires the President to present a
quarterly report to the Speaker of the House and to the Chairman
of the-Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 31 The report is to be
presented within 30 days of the close of each quarter. The quar-
terly report must set forth, in part: (1) A list of all unaccepted let-
ters of offer to sell defense equipment for any amount exceeding
or equal to $1 million; and, (2) a listing, by country, of all letters
of offer that have been accepted and the total dollar value of the
weapons or defense services sold. The advantage of these pro-
visions is that a full record of unaccepted letters of offer as well
as of all arms sales is maintained, continuously updated and regu-
larly presented to the Congress.
The notice provisions of sections 36(a), 21(f) and 25 are es-
sential elements of the effort to understand and direct the arms
selling operations of the United States. But these provisions only
call for the transmission of information relating to arms sales.
Amended section 36(b)(1) may be the most significant part of
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 because it is designed to
give Congress the ultimate authority to stop the issuance of a
letter of offer to a purchasing nation. In order to secure an ap-
proved letter of offer either for the sale of weapons or defense
services valued at $25 million or more, or for the sale of major
defense equipment worth $7 million or more, the President must
provide a "certification" to the Speaker of the House and to the
21 Id. § 209(a). See Appendix A.
30 Id.
31 Id. § 211(a),
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Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 32  Fol-
lowing delivery of the certification, Congress has 30 calendar days
in which to review the certification. If, before the expiration of
the 30 calendar day period, Congress adopts a concurrent resolu-
tion of objection to the sale the letter of offer for the sale will not
be issued. The President may override this resolution only if the
certification states that an emergency exists requiring the sale
as a means of protecting the security interests of the United
States.
It seems essential to recognize that the Arms Export Control
Act does not state any specific dollar limitation on cash sales of
conventional arms to eligible foreign nations.33 It is also sig-
nificant that the Act contains no restriction against cash sales of
the most advanced conventional weapons. 34 A nation which cur-
rently satisfies the eligibility requirements of section 3 and which
has sufficient funds to pay cash for weapons may proceed to the
limits of those funds. It is the responsibility of Congress, acting
on information supplied at the direction of the President, to pass
on the wisdom of the sale. Therefore, the extent to which the Arms
Export Control Act can succeed in controlling arms sales is a
measure of the diligence of the President in ensuring that the full
information is given to Congress and of the ability of Congress to
evaluate that information.
The sale of the F-16 to Iran is a major sale, but not the first.
Statistics indicate that Iran is the best customer for United States
arms in the Mideast. U.S. sales of weapons to Iran have ex-
panded from $113 million in 1970 to a high of more than $3.9
billion in 1974. 35  The Shah of Iran makes the final decisions on
all arms purchases. 36  The Shah is a pilot himself, and seems to
32 Id. See Appendix B.
33 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976 § 202(a)(1). This section provides that sales of arms and defense services
are not to "exceed current levels" in any fiscal year. However, if one considers
the size of the sales now being approved a restriction to current levels seems
like no restriction at all. The provision adds nothing to the ability of the law to
control the makings of arms sale decisions. Further, the provision states a sense
of Congress. As such the limitation does not carry the force of law.
34 Foreign Military Sales Act § 4. There are limitations on credit sales of
sophisticated weapons.
35 Center for Defense Information, U.S. Arms to the Persian Gulf: $10 Billion
Since 1973, THE DEFENSE MONITOR, May, 1975, at 2.
36 From a statement of the Shah, as reported in 122 CONG. REC. S15526
(daily ed. Sept. 10, 1976).
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take a particular interest in military jet aircraft. 37  However,
United States sales of conventional weapons to Iran run the gamut
of available types of conventional weaponry, including missiles,
tanks, artillery, fixed wing aircraft, helicopters, and warships z8
The F-16 is billed as the "swing force fighter of the 80's." 31
Technically designated as an air combat fighter, the F-16 is a
product of the Air Force lightweight fighter program.40  The
F-16 has been judged an outstanding performer, combining high
speed and superior maneuverability, 'advanced avionics and ord-
nance delivery systems, and, surprisingly, a low cost.4 ' Projected
figures indicate a unit price in the area of $6 million compared to
a cost of $15 million each for the McDonnell Douglas F-15,
another air combat fighter.42
The proposal to issue a letter of offer for the sale of the F-16
to Iran was but one item in a massive certification reported to
Congress on September 1, 1976.43  The September 1 report
contained 37 individual letters of offer for the sale of $6.024 billion
in conventional weapons to 11 foreign nations. 44  The proposed
letters of offer were received with alarm by some members of the
Congress, owing to the size of the reported proposals and the
timing of their delivery. Senator Bumpers commented:
Waiting until so late in the legislative session - to deluge the
Congress with this gargantuan commitment - tells us one of two
things: Either arms sales are indeed out of control as most
critics believe, or the administration is utilizing the tactic of
swamping the Congress with proposed sales all at one time in
hopes that we will find the task of careful examination within
the required thirty days impossible.45
It should also be noted that the Labor Day recess and weekends,
during which there were no sessions, resulted in even fewer days
37 Military jets, particularly fighters and fighter bombers, represented the
largest portions of Iran's military purchases: $2.71 billion from 1970 to 1974.
Center for Defense Information, supra note 35, at 5.
3 Id. Iran has also been given permission to purchase the newest DD 993
modified Spruance Class destroyer.
39 Carroll, F-16: The Swing Force Fighter of the 80's, AiR FoRcE, Oct., 1976,
at 33.
40 Id. See also Rider, Y-F.16 Pilot Report, AIR FORCE, Oct., 1976, at 33.
41 Carroll, supra note 34, at 31.
42 Id.
43 Supra note 10.
44Id.
45 122 CONG. REC. S15543 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Bumpers).
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available for consideration of the proposals. Assuming Congress
could devote every available day exclusively to consideration of
the proposals, which it could not, the available time seems in-
sufficient. It is unlikely that there was enough time to allow for
the kind of effective review of arms sales that is required by the
Arms Export Control Act. The facts relating to the timing of the
notification of Congress support the conclusion that the sale of
the F-16 to Iran may have been approved with little more than a
rubber stamp.
There is also evidence suggesting that Congress would not have
had enough information to fully review the F-16 sale even if there
had been sufficient time. The first hearing on the proposed sale
of the F-16 to Iran took place before the Subcommittee on Foreign
Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Sep-
tember 16, 1976. In his opening statement, Senator Humphrey
sharply criticized the Executive Branch for its failure to provide
information to the Committee. 46 Senator Humphrey went 'on to
charge that much of the information that had been received was
so superficial that it could " . . . not be regarded as a serious
response to the Committee's inquiries." 47  Senator Humphrey con-
cluded that this absence of cooperation indicated " . . . an al-
most total lack of respect on the part of the Executive Branch for
the Committee's role in considering arms sales matters."48
Senator Humphrey's statements are not the only indication
that the Executive Branch may not have met the obligation im-
posed by the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Senator Nelson
stated that the justifications for the letters of offer in the Sep-
tember 1 report were "flimsy" and " . . . totally inappropriate
to the magnitude of the impact these sales would have on U.S.
security and peace in the world." 49  The Senator emphasized
that the paucity of information delivered seemed particularly un-
acceptable given the resources at the command of the President:
[T]he [E]xecutive [B]ranch is well supplied with manpower
in the arms sale field who are working in various offices,
bureaus, and divisions of the different services of the Pentagon
and in the State Department, National Security Council,
46 Hearings on the Proposed Sale of 160 F-16 Aircraft to the Government of Iran
Before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 16, 1976) (Statement of Sen. Humphrey)
[hereinafter cited as the Humphrey Statement].
I Id. at 3.
41 Id.
49 Supra note 10.
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Office of -Management and Budget, and Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.50
The Senator also made reference to two unfinished reports: The
National Security Staff Memorandum on arms sales and a com-
prehensive study on the Persian Gulf region, neither of which
had been completed at the time the F-16 sale was considered.
Calling attention to the 1975 restriction on arms sales to Israel
pending a program reassessment, Senator Nelson expressed con-
cern that despite the lack of any comprehensive analysis demon-
strated by the Executive Branch, massive sales to the Persian
Gulf were still being proposed.51
The disquietude in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
as expressed by the statements of Senator Humphrey reflects a
concern that, regardless of the Arms Export Control Act, sales of
conventional weaponry to foreign nations are not being fully
examined and justified. The concern that the law is not producing
its intended results seems more pressing in view of the U.S.
sales of conventional weapons to Iran. The most complete ex-
amination of the history of United States arms sales to Iran is
the Staff Report to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. 2
The report examines the evolution of present arms sales and indi-
cates a major turning point was reached in May of 1972. At
that time, President Nixon assured the Shah of Iran virtual carte
blanche to purchase weapons from the United States.
The President informed the Shah (1) that the U.S. would sell
Iran the F-14 or F-15 aircraft; and (2) that in the future, the
U.S. would, in general, sell Iran any conventional weapons system
that it wanted. The decisions were confirmed in instructions
to the bureaucracys3 (emphasis added)
The decision to allow the Shah of Iran a free hand to purchase
weapons from the United States was made to further President
Nixon's "twin pillar" policy of assuring a stable Mideast through
United States defense sales and cooperation with Iran and Saudi
Arabia. The Nixon Administration decided to rely on local powers
in the Mideast rather than an increased U.S. military presence
to fill the security gap opened by the exit of the British in 1968.54
s0 Id.
sl Id.
52 REPORT ON U.S. MILITARY SALES TO [RAN BY THE STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM. REP.].
53 Id. at 5. Italics mine.
54 Id.
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The 1972 decision of President Nixon to remove restrictions on
conventional arms sales to Iran has brought about a tremendous
increase in arms sales to Iran.
Although these decisions are consistent with the "twin pillar"
policy, they marked the beginning of an arms sale boom to
Iran. The bureaucracy ceased its careful scrutiny of requests
by Iran except for the most sophisticated systems involving
release of state-of-the-art and highly classified technology. The
dramatic increase in oil prices in 1973 provided Iran with the
means to buy what it wanted15
Further, the original decision to exclude arms sales to Iran from
normal scrutiny has never been reconsidered in light of the oil
price increase.56  The Foreign Assistance Subcommittee Staff
Report concludes that arms sales to Iran were "poorly managed"
and "out of control" for at least 3 years.57 There seems to be
nothing in the facts relating to the approval of the F-16 sale to
Iran which suggests that there has been any change, regardless
of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Congress did not
pass a concurrent resolution objecting to the sale within 30 calen-
dar days. The letter of offer for the $3.8 billion sale was approved
automatically.
The facts surrounding the F-16 sale are irreconcilable with the
previously discussed policy statements of the Arms Export Con-
trol Act. The Act requires that arms sales be approved only
after thoughtful, informed decision-making. In the approval of
the sale of the F-16, the decision-making was rushed and based
on inadequate information. Therefore, Congress could not pro-
vide the overview that the Act is designed to ensure. The F-16
approval so directly contradicts the policies expressed in the Arms
Export Control Act that one might well ask if the avowed com-
mitment of the United States to the control of conventional arms
sales is more than a fa~ade. If the United States is committed
to the stated policies of the Arms Export Control Act, these
policy goals might be achieved more effectively by changing the
law.
The Arms Export Control Act requires the Executive Branch
to inform Congress regarding conventional arms sales. Congress
is responsible for reviewing the information. As discussed pre-
viously, the success of the Act must be measured by the com-
55 Id. at 6.
5 Id.
57 Id. at XII.
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pleteness of the information received by Congress and by the
ability of Congress to evaluate the information fully within 30
calendar days. If Congress is pressed for time, it is possible
that incomplete or unverified information will go unchallenged in
the haste. Three changes in the Arms Export Control Act
might alleviate this problem. The first change would be to ex-
tend the time limit for consideration of the letters of offer from
30 calender days to 30 session days. This would eliminate the
problems arising from a certification being delivered immediately
before a recess. Regardless of the timing of delivery, arms sales
would receive 30 full days of review.
A second means of ensuring full review would be to limit the
number of letters of offer that could be reported at one time.
As indicated the September 1, 1976, report to Congress contained
proposals for the sale of 37 weapons to 11 foreign nations, for a
total of $6.024 billion. A provision limiting the size of the report
by number of weapons to be sold, number of individual nations
intending to purchase, or dollar amount would protect the Con-
gress from becoming swamped in arms sale proposals.
The third change would be the most significant. Presently
the burden rests on Congress to raise objections to a letter of
offer or to request additional information from the Executive
Branch. In the absence of a request for additional information,
or a concurrent resolution of objection, the letter of offer passes
without challenge. The proposed change would involve shifting
this burden directly to the Executive Branch, providing that all
letters of offer subject to amended section 36(b) will be presumed
disapproved until justified. Under the proposed change the Ex-
ecutive Branch would be required to obtain a concurrent resolution
of approval from Congress in order to proceed with the sale. If
this change were made, the Executive Branch would more likely
be held to its obligation under the Act to provide adequate in-
formation to Congress. Any incentive to hinder a full review of a
letter of offer would be eliminated by this shifting of the burden.
Arguments can be made against the adoption of any of these
three proposals for change. The first of these arguments might
be that the change would sacrifice the flexibility presently exist-
ing in the field of arms sales, making these sales a less useful
instrument of foreign policy. Further, increasing the time and
effort required to process a letter of offer might hinder the con-
duct of foreign policy by casting doubt on the reliability of the
United States as a supplier of conventional weapons.
1977]
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It should be noted that the specific requirements relating to
the substance and quality of certifications and reports would
not be altered by any of the proposals for change. The only
change would be the extent to which the Executive Branch would
be encouraged to diligently meet existing requirements. Appropria-
tion requests for the United States defense budget carry no
presumption of approval. There seems to be little justification
for giving foreign sales of conventional arms a higher priority.
Further, Senator Humphrey has pointed out that the automatic
reporting requirements written into the Act had been kept to a
minimum to allow the President greater flexibility, but that the
lack of cooperation of the Executive Branch had hindered the
review process rather than helped it.58 The assertion that the
proposals for change would reflect negatively on the reliability of
the United States as a supplier raises two considerations. First,
it seems doubtful that reliability, by itself, is a virtue. Reliability
is desirable only if it follows a careful, informed decision to sell
conventional weapons to the particular country in question. The
reliable, uncontrolled delivery of weapons to a foreign nation
lends no credibility to an assertion by the United States that it is
committed to a policy of arms export control. Second, it is sug-
gested that reliability may not be as important as candor in deal-
ing with prospective purchasing nations. Thus, informing the
Shah of Iran of inherent economic and technical problems that
might militate against the purchase of a highly sophisticated
weapon might enhance a friendly relationship.59
The loss of the economic advantages for U.S. balance of pay-
ments might be advanced as a reason for rejecting proposals for
more control over conventional arms sales. As a corollary to
the first assertion, one might point to the advantage of reduced
weapons procurement costs for the United States as a result of
longer production runs due to foreign sales. This argument
assumes an ordering of United States policy priorities that is
incorrect. There is no indication in the policy statements of the
Arms Export Control Act that a favorable balance of payments
or a decreased procurement cost is to be offered as a justification
for United States arms sales. Sales are authorized to enable
recipient nations to meet legitimate defense needs, without placing
a burden on their national economies. 60 It is true that adoption
58 The Humphrey Statement, supra note 46, at 2.
'9 SUBCOMM. REP., supra note 52, at 50.
60 FOREIGN MILITARY SALES ACT § 1.
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of the proposals for change might lessen the economic advantages
of arms sales. But U.S. economic advantage is made subordinate
to the goal of bringing about control of the sale of conventional
weapons, as expressed in the Arms Export Control Act.
The facts of the sale of the F-16 indicate that, despite the
Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the United States is not yet
prepared to assume its promised role as leader in the campaign to
put an end to the massive, indiscriminate trade in conventional
implements of war.
HENRY E. BILLINGSLEY, II*
APPENDIX A
ANNUAL ESTIMATE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR SALES PROGRAM
SEC. 209. (a) Immediately after section 24 of the Foreign Military
Sales Act, add the following new section:
"SEC. 25. ANNUAL ESTIMATE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR SALES PRO-
GRAM. - (a) The President shall transmit to the Congress, as a part of
the presentation materials for security assistance programs proposed for
each fiscal year, a report which sets forth -
"(1) an estimate of the amount of sales expected to be made to
each country under sections 21 and 22 of this Act, including a de-
tailed explanation of the foreign policy and United States national
security considerations involved in expected sales to each country;
"(2) an estimate of the amount of credits and guaranties ex-
pected to be extended to each country under sections 23 and 24 of
this Act;
"(3) a list of all findings which are in effect on the date of such
transmission made by the President pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of
this Act, together with a full and complete justification for each
such finding, explaining how sales to each country with respect to
which such finding has been made will strengthen the security of
the United States and promote world peace; and
"(4) an arms control impact statement for each purchasing
country, including (A) an analysis of the relationship between ex-
pected sales to each country and arms control efforts relating to
that country, and (B) the impact of such expected sales on the
stability of the region that includes the purchasing country.
"(b) Not later than thirty days following the receipt of a request
made by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate or the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives
for additional information with respect to any estimate submitted pur-
suant to subsection (a), the President shall submit such information to
such committee.
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"(c) The President shall make every effort to submit all of the in-
formation required by this section wholly in unclassified form. In the
event the President submits any such information in classified form, he
shall submit such classified information in an addendum and shall also
submit simultaneously a detailed summary, in unclassified form, of such
classified information."
(b) Section 634(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended
by striking out "and military sales under this or any other Act" in the
fourth sentence.
APPENDIX B
REPORTS ON COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENTAL MILITARY EXPORTS;
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
SEC. 211. (a) Section 36 of the Foreign Military Sales Act is
amended to read as follows:
"(b)(1) In the case of any letter of offer to sell any defense
articles or services under this Act for $25,000,000 or more, or any
major defense equipment for $7,000,000 or more, before such letter of
offer is issued, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate a numbered certification with
respect to such offer to sell containing the information specified in
clauses (i) through (iv) of subsection (a). In addition, the Presi-
dent shall, upon the request of such committee or the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives, transmit
promptly to both such committees a statement setting forth, to the
extent specified in such request -
"(A) a detailed description of the defense articles or services
to be offered, including a brief description of the capabilities of any
defense article to be offered;
"(B) an estimate of the number of officers and employees of
the United States Government and of United States civilian con-
tract personnel expected to be needed in such country to carry out
the proposed sale;
"(C) the name of each contractor expected to provide the
defense article or defense service proposed to be sold (if known on
the date of transmittal of such statement);
"(D) an analysis of the arms control impact pertinent to such offer
to sell, prepared in consultation with the Secretary of Defense;
"(E) the reasons why the foreign country or international or-
ganization to which the sale is proposed to be made needs the
defense articles or services which are the subject of such sale and a
description of how such country or organization intends to use such
defense articles or services;
"(F) an analysis by the President of the impact of the proposed
sale on the military stocks and the military preparedness of the
United States;
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"(G) the reasons why the proposed sale is in the national interest
of the United States;
"(H) an analysis by the President of the impact of the proposed
sale on the military capabilities of the foreign country or inter-
national organization to which such sale would be made;
"(I) an analysis by the President of how the proposed sale would
affect the relative military strengths of countries in the region to
which the defense articles or services which are the subject of such
sale would be delivered and whether other countries in the region
have comparable kinds and amounts of defense articles or services;
"U) an estimate of the levels of trained personnel and main-
tenance facilities of the foreign country or international organiza-
tion to which the sale would be made which are needed and avail-
able to utilize effectively the defense articles or services proposed
to be sold;
"(K) an analysis of the extent to which comparable kinds and
amounts of defense articles or services are available from other
countries;
"(L) an analysis of the impact of the proposed sale on United
States relations with the countries in the region to which the de-
fense articles or services which are the subject of such sale would
be delivered; and
"(M) a detailed description of any agreement proposed to be
entered into by the United States for the purchase or acquisition
by the United States of defense articles, services, or equipment,
or other articles, services, or equipment of the foreign country or
international organization in connection with, or as consideration
for, such letter of offer, including an analysis of the impact of such
proposed agreement upon United States business concerns which
might otherwise have provided such articles, services, or equip-
ment to the United States, an estimate of the costs to be incurred
by the United States in connection with such agreement compared
with costs which would otherwise have been incurred, an estimate
of the economic impact and unemployment which would result
from entering into such proposed agreement, and an analysis of
whether such costs and such domestic economic impact justify
entering into such proposed agreement.
A certification transmitted pursuant to this subsection shall be unclassi-
ed, except that the information specified in clause (ii) and the details
of the description specified in clause (iii) of subsection (a) may be
classified if the public disclosure thereof would be clearly detrimental
to the security of the United States. The letter of offer shall not be
issued if the Congress, within thirty calendar days after receiving such
certification, adopts a concurrent resolution stating that it objects to
the proposed sale, unless the President states in his certification that
an emergency exists which requires such sale in the national security
interests of the United States.
"(2) Any such resolution shall be considered in the Senate in ac-
cordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
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"(3) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and adoption
of concurrent resolutions under this subsection, a motion to proceed
to the consideration of any such resolution after it has been reported by
the appropriate committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the
House of Representatives.
"(c) In the case of an application by a person (other than\with re-
gard to a sale under section 21 or section 22 of this Act) for a license for
the export of any major defense equipment sold under a contract in
the amount of $7,000,000 or more or of defense articles or defense services
sold under a contract in the amount of $25,000,000 or more, not less than
30 days before issuing such license the President shall transmit to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the chairman of the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an unclassified num-
bered certification with respect to such application specifying (1) the
foreign country or international organization to which such export will
be made, (2) the dollar amount of the items to be exported, and (3) a
description of the items to be exported. In addition, the President shall,
upon the request of such committee or the Committee on International
Relations of the House of Representatives, transmit promptly to both
such committees a statement setting forth, to the extent specified in
such request, a description of the capabilities of the items to be ex-
ported, an estimate of the total number of United States personnel
expected to be needed in the foreign country concerned in connection
with the items to be exported and an analysis of the arms control im-
pact pertinent to such application, prepared in consultation with the
Secretary of Defense. A certification transmitted pursuant to this
subsection shall be unclassified, except that the information specified
in paragraph (2) and the details of the description specified in para-
graph (3) may be classified if the public disclosure thereof would be
clearly detrimental to the security of the United States.
"(d) In the case of an approval under section 38 of this Act of a
United States commercial technical assistance or manufacturing licens-
ing agreement for or in a country not a member of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization which involves the manufacture abroad of any
item of significant combat equipment on the United States Munitions
List, before such approval is given, the President shall submit a certifica-
tion with respect to such proposed commercial agreement in a manner
similar to the certification required under subsection (c) containing
comparable information, except that the last sentence of such subsection
shall not apply to certifications submitted pursuant to this subsection."
(b) The amendment made by subsection (a) of this section shall
apply with respect to letters of offer for which a certification is trans-
mitted purusant to section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act on or
after the date of enactment of this Act and to export licenses for which
an application is filed under section 38 of such Act on or after such date.
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